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Both Thomas Hobbes and John Locke utilize a "state of nature" 
construct to elucidate their more general views onhuman nature and 
politics. Yet their conceptions of man's original condition in the state 
of nature are usually contrasted: the political philosophy of Locke's 
Second Treatise paints man as a "pretty decent fellow," far removed 
from the quarrelsome, competitive, selfish creatures said to be found 
in Hobbes's Leviathan.1 Lockean man seems to be more naturally 
inclined to civil society, supposedly more governed by reason. From 
this interpretation of human nature, Locke concluded that the state 
of nature was no condition of war, placing himself in opposition to 
the traditional interpretation of Hobbes. 
Itismy contention that although Locke painstakingly attempts to 
disassociate himself with the Hobbesian notion of the "se1f-inter­
ested man" in a perpertual "state of war," the execution of this 
attempt falls short, and can even be recognized to implicitly (if not 
explicitly) contain the very reasoning that Hobbes ulilizes to advo­
cate the movement ofman from the state of nature to civil society. In 
order to demonstrate the truth ofthis contention, I will briefly ou tline 
the development of their philosophies and offer both a reinterpreta­
tion ofthe Hobb esian sta te of nature, and a cri tical anal ysis 0 fLoc ke' 5 
view of the state of nature in the Second Treatise. 
I. Hobbes: Method and Problem 
Hobbes offered a materialistic metaphysics that utilized a simpli­
fied version of Galileo's resolutio-compositive method. According 
to this method, complex phenomena are broken down into their 
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simplest natural motions and components. Once these elements are 
understood, the workings of complex wholes are easily derived. 
Hobbes' intent was to develop a systematic study in three parts, 
starting with simple motions in matter (De Corpore), moving to the 
study ofhuman nature (De Homine) , and finally to politics (De Cive), 
each based, respectively, on a lower level of analysis (Lasco and 
Williams, p. 230). Hence, reality for Hobbes is reducible to mechanis­
tic and material principles, or, simply stated, bodies m motion. Ifwe 
are to understand politics. Hobbes suggests that we should look at 
such phenomena in tenus of the relationships between "men in. 
motion." 
Furthermore, Hobbes adopted the Galilean proposition that that 
which is in motion continues in motion until altered by some other 
force. (Of course, this is a theoretical assumption which, indepen­
dently, cannot be proven true or false, since all we do observe are 
bodies that are acted upon by such forces). Likewise, Hobbes as­
sumed that human beings act voluntarily based upon their "pas­
sions," until they are resisted by another force or forces. This outward 
motion of the individual is the beginning of voluntary motion, which 
Hobbes calls "endeavor." Endeavor directed towards an object is 
called "appetite" or"desire." Endeavor dlrected away from an object 
is called "aversion" (Gauthier, p. 6). 
The several passions of manare "species" of desires and aversion, 
which are directed toward those objects whose effects produce 
pleasure and away from those objects which produce pain. Thus, 
Hobbes conceives men to be self-maintaining engines whose "mo­
tion is such that it enables them to continue to 'move' as long as 
continued motion IS possible" (Gauthier, p. 7). 
From this account of utili tousmotion, itlogically follows, accord­
ing to Hobbes, that each man in the state of nature seeks only to 
preserve and strengthen himself. "A concern for continued well­
being is both the necessary and sufficient ground of human action; 
hence, man.is necessarily selfish" (Gauthier, p. 7). 
!tis this perpetual endeavor for self-preservation within the state 
of nature which gives rise to a condition of "war." Hobbes believes 
that men, being originally all equal in the "faculties of the body and 
mind," equally hope to fulfill their ends of vital motion (Leviathan, p. 
100). Hence, if "two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless 
they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies," for both, knowing 
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naturalmorallaw would b e privy to the unconditional, absolute and 
categorical right to preserve oneself at all cost (Leviathan, p. 98).This 
state of war encompasses all, "everyman, against everyman" (Levia­
than, p. 100). Without a common power to police and settle disputes, 
man is in a perpetual condition of war; "war consisting not only in 
battle, orin the act of fighting, but in awillingness to contendbybattle 
being sufficiently recognized" (Leviathan, p. 100). The state of nature 
is seen as a condition in which the will to fight others is known, 
fighting is not infrequent and each individual perceives that his life 
and well-being are in constant danger (Leviathan, p. 100). Accord­
ingly,menin the state of nature live without security other than their 
own strength; this is argued to be the natural condition of mankind, 
and leads Hobbes to the conclusion that such existence is "natural" 
to man, but not rational (whereas society is seen as rational, but not 
natural, contra Aristotle) (Kavka, p. 292). 
It is within this irrational condition of "war," or Hobbesian"fear" 
or "despair," inwhichhumanbeings find little hope ofattaining their 
ends without conflict, that mortal men are compelled to elect a 
sovereign and move out of the state of nature; only then can the 
imperative of self-preservation be truly fulfilled through peace 
(Lemos, p. 24). It is important to note that the state of nature, for 
Hobbes, is a philosophic device employed as a means ofhypothesiz­
ing about humanbehavior in a pre-political and pre-socia] state, Le., 
a state without any extemal constraint on behavior. As Hobbes 
indicates, His not necessary to presume such a state actually existed, 
only that it captures essential features human beings would exhibit 
in such a condition. 
Hobbes' political philosophy was received in his own time with 
nearly universal rejection, being more often renounced than actually 
read. Hobbes was labelled an atheist, the "monster of Malmesbury," 
a schemer, a heretic and a blasphemer (De Cive, p. xx). His advocacy 
of an absolute monarch as the solution to man's inherent condition 
further distanced him from the "enlightened" mainstream of 17th 
century political thought, including Locke's philosophy. It is a 
commonly held view that although Locke makes no specificmention 
of Hobbes in the Second Treatise, itmay nonetheless be interpreted as 
an attempt to systematically refute both the notion of absolute mon­
archy and Hobbes's description of the state of nature (Lemos, p. 74). 
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II. John Locke: Method and Problem 
Philosophy, Locke tells the reader in the introduction ofhis Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding, is "nothing but true knowledge of 
things." Properly, philosophy contains the whole of knowledge, 
which Locke himself divides into three parts: a physica or natural 
philosophy, practica or moral philosophy, and logic, the"doctrine of 
signs." The goal of the philosopher is to build as complete a system 
as he possibly can within these three categories (Aaron, p. 74). 
Yet Locke persuasively argues in the Essay that mankind's ability 
to gain true knowledge is significantly limited, and sets himself the 
taskof determining the demarcations of human knowledge. To help 
mankind rid itself of this "unfortunate" failing, he argues that man 
has been endowed with talents capable of allowing him to live a 
useful and profitable life. The Essay is extremely pradical: we should 
concentrate on what we can know, and not waste our energy or e Hort 
searching for knowltdge of things which lie beyond us (Aaron, p. 77). 
It is exactly these practical and utilitarian ends that moti va ted the 
construction of his nloral and political philosophy. Although politi­
cal and moral philosophy are not reducible to metaphysical plin­
dples thot app.ly outside of their respective fields of inquiry (thus 
explnining the difficulties between advocating, on one hand, the 
strict empiricism of the Essay, and, on the other hand, the rationalist 
naturalluw theory of the Two Treatises), in all of his writings Locke 
assumes, fu ndamentally, that man knows enough to live a good and 
righteous hfe if he so chooses. 
Locke argued that the state of nature is not identical to the state 
of war, and, although it is "inconvenient," nature is governed by a 
nuturullnw known by reason, the "coounon rule and measure God 
hus given mankind." The nalurallaw "teaches all mankind who will 
but consult it that, being all equal and independent, no on€: ought to 
harm anothel: in his Hfe, health, liberty or property" (Locke, p. 4). If 
the law of nature is observed, the state of nature remains peaceful; 
conv(mtional wisdom defines this condition as one of mutual love 
(via the "judicious" Richard Hooker), from whence are "derived the 
great maxims of justice and charity" (Locke, p. 4). 
Yet, according to Locke, God has instilled in natural man a 
"strong obligation of necessity, convenience and inclination to drive 
him into society"; hence, men quit their "natural power, resigned it 
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up into the hands of the community" for the assurance that their 
property will be preserved (Locke, pp. 44, 48, 53). 
Men being, as has been said, by nature free, equal and 
independent, no one can be put out of this estate and 
subjected to the political power of another without 
his own consent. The only way whereby anyone 
divests himself of his natural liberty and put on the 
bonds ofcivil society is by agreeing with other men to 
joinandunite into a community for their comfortable, 
safe and peaceable living one amongst another, in a 
secure enjoyment of their properties and a greater 
securitr against any that are not of it. (Locke, p. 53).2 
An equally important factor motivating mento forfeit the perfect 
freedom of the state of nature is that within this environment, each 
manhas a right to interpret natural law and to punish what he judges 
to be violations of it (Lemos, p. 85). Anyone who violates another's 
right to life, liberty or property has placed himself in a state of war, 
and the innocent party has the right to destroy those who act against 
him because those that are waging war do not live under the rule of 
reason, and, as a result, have no other rule but that of force and 
violence. Furthermore, this state of war would be perpetual ifjustice 
could not be fairly administered (Locke, pp. 11,13). 
Therefore, in order to avoid a state of war, Locke suggests that 
one must forfeit the state of nature, creating an environment where 
disputes can be decided upon by an impartial authority (Locke, p. 
14). 
It would seem, at least upon prima facia analysis, that although 
both thinkers utilize a state of nature device to demonstrate political 
necessity, their similarities would end there. Hobbes' slate of nature 
would seem to be populated by self-interested egoists whose per­
sonal gain is ultimately important. Locke ,on the other hand, appears 
to suggest that a "civil" nature permeates pre-ci viI society to such an 
extent that man is voluntarily obliged to respect his fellow human 
beings. and the formation of civil society soon follows. 
The common conception regarding the state of nature theories of 
Hobbes and Locke is thus presented. I shall now turn to the argu­
2 A classic statement of libertarianism! 
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ments as to why this conception is invalid, beginning wi th a reassess­
ment of Hobbes' position, followed by specific argtunents regarding 
Locke 'snotion of pre-political man' smoti vation to pursue civil ends. 
III. Reassessing Hobbes 
To understand morality and politics, Hobbes argues that one 
must understand man qua man; hence, psychology becomes the 
necessary foundation of moral and political science. And the only 
way to view mankind in its most natural condition is to assume a 
hypothetical state of nature in which men act purely out of passion, 
void of reason at Ieast initially. Hobbes' account ofthe state of nature, 
as shown in Chapter 17 of Leviathan, was expressly "designed to 
provide a glimpse of man without the garb of convention, h'adition 
orsociety, so asto uncover the underlying principles ofthemundane 
equity of natural man, without assuming an transcendent purpose or 
will" (Lasco and Williams, p. 252). Therefore, Hobbes' prescription 
for stability was a deduction from the necessary behavior of man in 
a theoretical society, nnt emphasizing how men ought to act, but 
rather how they would act void of any relationships, whatsoever. It 
is in this condition that our endeavors dispose us towards plensllre 
or pain; man, being concerned with only those endeavors which 
serve to preserve himself, chooses those objects which meet this 
condition. Hence, man wOl1Jd find himself often in competition with 
others for the same objects, and a state of war would ensue, with each 
having the "right to everything" he wishes.3 
Historically, the negative interpretation of this condition of 
nature, being a "war of all against all," has been dominant in political 
and philosophical circles. Sterling Lamprecht defines the common 
conception of Hobbes' psychology as follows: 
God made man such a beast and a rascal that he 
3Keep in mind that the aim of Hobbes is not to suggest thnt we can actually 
observe such a condition, or that it is even remotely possible; this is m0rdy a 
fundqmental axiom in Hobbes' thought experiment. In fact, R.E. Ewin hilS nrgued 
that this more radical form of the natural condition is lIsed by Hobbes as part of a 
reductio, as to pointou t the logical inconsistencies between simultaneously ilssuming 
the existence of both such a natur<ll condition and the pursuit of self-preservation: 
they ultimately prove contradictory (Ewin, p. 108). 
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inclines universally to malice and fraud. Man's typi­
cal acts. UJ1Jess he is restrained by force, are violent 
and ruthless, savagely disregarding the persons and 
property of his fellows. His greatest longing is to 
preserve himself by gaining power over others and 
exploiting others for his own egoistic ends (De Cive, p. 
xx). 
Lamprecht labels this view "Hobbism," and argues that in this 
view of human nature, Hobbes is far from being a Hobbist. Hobbes 
gives, to be sure, a picture of man in the state of nature which is far 
from becoming. But, Lamprecht argues, Hobbes did not intend to say 
that his picture of manin the state of nature is an exhaustive account 
of human nature. Rather, the concept of man in the state of nature 
enables us to measure the extent to which reason andsocial pressures 
Le., other "forces" determine and direct the expression of human 
passions. 
The idea of man in the state of nature is for social 
science like that of a natural body in physical science. 
Physical science holds that a body continues in a state 
of rest or uniform motion in a straight line unless 
influenced by outside forces. Actually, there is no 
body which is not influenced by outside bodies; but 
the idea of such a body enables us to measure the 
outside forces (De Cive, p. xxi). 
Such a natural man in "full motion" would be observable when­
ever one operates wholly under the dominion of passion, without the 
restraint, or to use Hobbes' language, "the opposing force," o.f 
reason. Man, acting on his own, with no concern for others' sel£­
preservation, guided by short-term considerations only, is doomed 
to failure in a state of nature. But if long-term moral and political 
arrangements (i.e., a voluntary social contract) enable them to main­
tain themselves without facing a war of all against all, then the basic 
cause for hostility is removed (Gauthier, pp. 18-19). In fact, many 
scholars suggest that the whole concern of Hobbes' moral and 
political philosophy is to show men the way out of this short-term 
condition of war and into a long-term condition ofpeace, for human 
life can continue only if mankind can remove itself from such a 
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condition. David Gauthier, inhis treatise titled The Logic OfLeviathan, 
states this argument most eloquently: 
In the beginning, everyman has an unlimited right to 
do what he will, conceiving it to be for his preserva­
tion. But the exercise of this unlimited right is one of 
the causes of the war of all against all, which is 
inimical to preservation. Thus the unlimited right of 
nature proves contradictory in its use; the man who 
exercises his right in order to preserve himself con­
tributes thereby to the war of all against all, which 
tends to his own destruction. And so it is necessary to 
give up some part of the unlimited natural right. ... 
The fundamental law of nature is "that every man 
ought to endeavor peace, as far as he has hope of 
obtaining it." The law is the most general conclusion 
man derives from his experience of the war of all 
against all. Clearly it depends on that experience, 
whether real or imagined. Although hypothetically a 
man might conclude that it was necessarily inimical 
to human life, only an analysis of the human condi­
tion with all social bonds removed shows that peace 
is the primary requisite for preservation (Gauthier, 
pp.51-53), 
The salvation of mankind, for Hobbes, depends on the fact that 
although nature has placed him in an unpleasant condition, it has 
also endowed him with the possibility of removing himself from it, 
as revealed through the use of reason i.e., the rational desire to pursue 
those avenues in which the hope of attaining peaceful existence is 
real! To argue that the state of nature, for Hobbes, is purely brutish 
and warlike, devoid of rationality or reason, is to miss the point: it is 
a necessary ingredient to lead man out of the state of nature and into 
a civil society. Hobbes' visionofnaturernightbe but a limited guide; 
yet, to borrow the words of Gauthier, "it is a truth which we must 
endeavor to overcome-but we shall not overcome it ifwe misunder­
stand it, deny it, or ignore it (Gauthier, p. 180). 
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IV. Locke and Political Motivation 
What follows are several arguments which independently sug­
gest that the Lockean state of nature implicitly admits of a Hobbesian 
condition of war, for Locke himself views conflict as the primary 
motivating factor that necessarily compels man to leave the state of 
nature and enter civil society. 
Initially, it is important to establish a fundamental point of 
difference between these two theories: Locke's state of nature is pre­
political (Le., prior to common authority). whereas, for Hobbes, it is 
pre-social. Locke refers to a situation in which a collection of human 
beings are not subject to political authority, not a situation in which 
there exists no form of rudimentary organization, much less an 
organized society (Lemos, p. 89). Hobbes uses the expression "state 
of nature" to denote a situation in whichmendo not live inany form 
of society at all, regardless of how fundamental. Furthermore, his 
definition tells us w hatpeople would be like if they could be divested 
of "all their learned responses or culturally induced behavior pat­
terns, especially those such as loyalty patriotism, religious fervor or 
class honor" that frequently could override the "fear" that Hobbes 
speaks of so dramatically in pre;-civil society (Hinchman, p. 10). 
If we were to assume man as existing pre-socially as Hobbes does 
(a condition without, trade, without the arts, without knowledge, 
without any account of time, without society itself), it seems a rather 
intuitive implication that he might be motivated by only self-cen­
tered drives, for that would be the extent of his learned behavior 
within this condition. Locke, on the other hand, takes social and 
cultural bonds for granted and argues purely from a pre-political 
position. Even a hypothetical Lockean might act a bit more selfishly 
in a Hobbesian state of nature; once semantic discrepancies are taken 
into account, these definitions already begin to appear closer to 
agreement. 
Secondly, Locke's position seems tobe a normative prescription, 
as opposed to a theoretical description. For example: in chapter II, 
section 6 of the Second Treatise, Locke argues that through reason, 
those who consult the law of nature will learn that no one "ought" to 
harm another's life, liberty or possessions. This phrasing seems to 
suggest a normative position, prescribing how man should live in a 
state of nature, versus the account that Hobbes constructs upon his 
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theoretical premises. These positions are notmutually exclusive: one 
can observe pre-civil manin a Hobbesian state of nature and morally 
prescribe a Lockean state of nature as a more "civil" alternative. 
Thirdly, Locke seems to provide evidence for the Hobbesian 
assumption thatmanoften acts out of selfishness and criminal intent. 
Initially Locke seems somewhat ambiguous about precisely what 
motivates the man of nature to move to civil society: he states that 
God has instilled a "strong obligation of necessity, convenience and 
inclination to drive him into society." But why would man leave a 
state of nature that, at least according to Locke, provides him the 
ultimate liberty andpower over his destiny, a condition that he likens 
to "a state of peace , good-will, mutual assistance and preservation"? 
If the man in the state of nature be so free, as has been 
said, if he be absolute lord of his own person and 
possessions, equal to the greatest, and subject to 
nobody, why will he part with his freedom, why will 
he give up his empire and subject himself to the 
domin.bn and control of any other power? To which 
it is obvious to answer that though in the state of 
nature he has such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is 
very uncertain and constantly exposed to the invasion of 
others .., This makes him willing to quit a condition 
which, however free, is full offeal' and continual dangers 
(Locke, p. 71), 
He continues: 
were it not for the corruption and viciousness of degen­
erate men, there would be no need of any other law, 
no necessity that men should separate from this great 
and natural community" (Locke, p. 72). 
IfLocke 'sstate of nature is truly as "rational" and "concerned" as 
he suggests, why is the only motivating factor powerful enough to 
move men out of this condition that which he so vehemently denies 
exists: a Hobbesian condition of "war"? 
Locke clearly states in the Second Treatise that one of the natural 
rights that must be granted to all men in the state of nature, equally, 
is that man should interpret natural law for himself and decide upon 
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appropriate punishment for offenders since there exists no common 
judge to settle controversies between men. It is precisely this intui­
tive and pre-political knowledge of the natural law that is said to 
enlighten man to the burdens of civil SOciety. 
Yet Locke argues persuasively that any knowledge of a natural 
law is more often than not hindered due to mankind's inherent 
epistemic limitations. Man's own unquenchable and boundless cu­
riosi ty itself becomes a hindrance. Richard Aaron uses the words of 
Locke's Essay to demonstrate this point: 
Thus men, extending their inquiries beyond their 
capacities and letting their thoughts wander into 
these depths where they can find no sure footing, 'tis 
no wonder they raise questions and multiply dis­
putes, which never coming to any clear resolution, 
are proper only to continue and increase their doubts 
and to confirm them at last in perfect skepticism 
(Aaron, p. 77). 
Even if one accepted that a natural law existed, Locke's clear 
rejection of man's ability to know this law with any degree of 
certainty, combined with his suggestion that foreknowledge of such 
a law does not guarantee moral action, would seem to suggest a 
condition of skepticism anddisagreement. This position is strikingly 
similar to Hobbes' argument that although human reason is capable 
of discerning the laws of nature, mankind is unable to consistently 
follow the dictates of such reason (Lamprecht, De Cive, p. xxix). In 
fact, one of the strongest arguments that Locke proposes to reject in 
the First Treatise is the divine right theory of Sir Robert Filmer, which 
is based upon the notion that even if a right of succession had been 
determined by a law of nature, our knowledge of natural law is 
limited to such a degree that there remains no compelling reason to 
accept one explanation over another. 
Furthermore, such subjective interpretations of the natural law 
would logically imply an unfairly administered and inconsistent 
justice. Locke continues: 
for everyone in the state of nature being both judge 
and executioner, of the laws of nature, men being 
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partial to themselves, passion and revenge is very apt to 
carry them too far with too much heat in their own 
cases, as well as negligence and unconcernedness to 
make them remiss in other men's (Locke, p. 71). 
This seems contradictory to an environment of peace and fellowship, 
and Locke strongly suggests that a state of war would exist if justice 
could not be fairly administered. 
Consider this: For Locke, in the absence of a neutral judge, no one 
can accurately know truthfully whether his cause is right or wrong. 
Thus, everyone is at liberty to believe himself right. Patrick Colby 
provides case-in-point: 
IT one person fears his neighbor, whether with cause 
or without (for only an individual can judge), by this 
partial and subjective determination the neighbor 
becomes a wild beast and is lawfully destroyed. But 
when the neighbor, now the target of attack, might 
understandably conclude thathis assailant is the wild 
beast and so endeavor to execute the law of nature 
against him (Colby, p. 3). 
But this means that Locke's state of nature will not divide neatly 
into groups of "upright law-abiders and selfish malefactors." And if 
a distinction cannot be made between such individuals, it would 
seem impossible for justice to be administered effectively. Locke 
himself deduces suell a conclusion: 
The inconveniences that they are therein exposed by 
the irregular and uncertain exercise of the power 
every man has of punishing the transgressions of 
others make them take sanctuary under the law of 
government (Locke, p. 71). . 
Locke makes it clear from the beginning of his argument and increas­
ingly so ashe progresses, that because judgment and punishmen tare 
in the hands of everyman, the state of nature works very poorly 
(Godwin, pp. 126-127). And in the state of nature, conflict (or a 
willingness to contend by conflict), once begun, and once unable to 
achieve a satisfactory resolution, would tend to continue to a harsh 
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ending, because there exists no authority to subject bothparties to the 
fair determination of the law (Godwin, p. 127). 
This potential inconsistency in the application of natural law 
seems, for Locke, to create significant enough hardships to motivate 
man to civil sOciety: 
I easily grant that civil government is the proper 
remedy for the inconveniences of the state of nature, 
which must certainly be great where men may be 
judges in their own case; since it is easy to be imag­
ined that he who was to be unjust as to do his brother 
an injury will scarce be so just as to condemn himself 
for it (Locke, p. 9). 
Clearly, Locke's original state of nature, ifnot absolutely equiva­
lent to Hobbes' state of nature, is at the very least a place of extreme 
anxieties, inconveniences, inequality and fear of the potential out­
break of war. Locke provides convincing evidence that the state of 
nature wouldbe so dangerous andunhappy, and the preservation of 
one's right to life so precarious, that the law of nature demands that 
the state of nature be abandoned for civil society (Locke, p. 18). 
Though Locke suggests that his state of nature is not a Hobbesian 
condition of "war," a closer examination of this argument would 
tend to suggest that without the failure of the state of nature to 
guarantee a secure peace, mankind would never voluntarily choose 
to forfeit his absolute freedom. Jean Faurot provides support: 
But (Locke's) state of nature also includes a condition 
scarcely distinguishable from that which Hobbes 
describes as a state of war-all that is needed is for 
some man to act contrary to reason, because in the 
state of nature every man is obligated to punish 
evildoers. In this way, war begins, with the right on 
the side of the innocent to destroy the evildoer, or, if 
he prefers, to enslave him. Nor is there any end to this 
condition in the state of nature, where every man is 
both judge and executioner. The slightest disagree­
mentis enough to set men fighting, and the victory of 
the righteous is never secure. Therefore, menhave the 
strongest reasons for leaving the state of nature and 
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entering civil society (Faurot, p. 75). 
Hence, not only do I argue that Locke's state of nature corre­
sponds to Hobbes' notion of a condition of perpetual fear, or the 
"state of war," but it actually becomes the identical catalyst by which 
Lockean man justifies movement to civil society. 
V. Conclusion 
The point of this presentation is clear: the common conception of 
Locke as the political propounder of the polite school of positive, 
optimistic descriptive psychology is an inaccurate characterization. 
Furthermore, the also-common contrasting of Locke's view of man 
in the state of nature with Hobbes' theoretical consideration of 
natural man has been misunderstood. Hobbes did not concern 
himself with a "plain, historical method": his concerns were with 
devising a system of government (albeit monarchial) that would best 
servemankind's inherent drive for both self-preservation and peace. 
Men enter civil society because the state of nature tends to 
deteriorate into a condition of unrest and insecurity. If all men were 
rational and virtuous, apprehending and obeying a natural law, 
th.::.re would be no problem. The presence of a few men acting in 
opposition to reason, combined with an environment lacking a 
common authority to arbih'ate disputes, creates a condition of insta­
bility and provides the necessary impetus for, in Locke's words, 
"reasonable part of positive agreement": a social contract (Faurot, p. 
75), 
Whether one accepts a reinterpretation of Hobbes' state of nature 
construct, or a closer examination of Locke's arguments, it is clear 
that, although not identical, their analyses offer many striking simi­
1arities. And, more importantly. without the instability and fear 
within the state of nature, neither philosopher could logically infer 
movement from nature to civil society: it becomes the necessary, 
perhaps sufficient cause for any social contract. 
Therefore, the classical juxtaposition of Hobbes' and Locke's 
state of nature theories is at best questionable and far from convinc­
ing. 
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